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Defense of the Strait
The battle as a defense of the strait, was the prelude to the invasion and disembarkation in the Bay of Cádiz of the army of the Caliphate. The battle was a naval battle fought by the navy of the Caliphate against the combined fleets of the ships of Gibraltar and Malagka, during the Cadiz Campaign of the War of the Caliphate. Twenty-seven Islamic ships led by Emir-Admiral Sulayman Agha aboard the "Glory of Al-lāh" defeated thirty-three Gibraltar and Malagka ships under the command of Commander Ghoul Bazan. The battle took place in the Strait of Gibraltar, on the southwest coast of Spain, just west of Bahía de Cádiz, near the city of Cádiz. The Gibraltar-Malagka fleet lost twenty-two ships and the Caliphate lost ten. The victory confirmed the naval supremacy that the Caliphate army had established and was achieved in part by the use of ancient naval combat strategies and the experience of the corsairs of the Caliphate. Background In the 22nd century, the Caliphate was the dominant military power in West Africa, while the Gibraltar Military Base carried out sabotage and insurgency operations in the most troubled territories of the "Islamic Empire". All change when during an operation called Alhambra, those responsible for frustrating a sale of information, were identified. The Caliph was determined to invade Spain. To do so, he needed to make sure that Gibraltar could not interrupt the landing, which would require control of the Strait of Gibraltar. The main fleets opposing the Caliphate in the port of Gibraltar and in Malagka. The Gibraltar Military Base and Malagka were allied, so the fleet would be joint. The Califal Navy had a corps of experienced naval officers well trained in looting and piracy expeditions. In contrast, Malagka lacked an experienced officer, Gibraltar being the only ones with competent naval officers. The Navy of Gibraltar possessed a remarkable number of pre-war warships but could not fight against the amount that the Caliphate would surely display. Malagka, on the other hand, lacked military shipyards capable of carrying out great naval titans, so they deployed their war ship "Malagka" together with 29 Light Craft. The Caliphate, however, ordered Emir-Admiral Suleyman Agham to command the war fleet, a reputed privateer named by his ship "Glory of Al-lāh" which could be considered a battleship, together with a similar fleet of heavy ships. The battle Suleyman's plan The prevailing tactical orthodoxy at the time involved manoeuvring to approach the enemy fleet in a single line of battle and then engaging broadside in parallel lines. Before this time the fleets had usually been involved in a mixed mêlée. One reason for the development of the line of battle system was to facilitate control of the fleet: if all the ships were in line, signaling in battle became possible. The line also allowed either side to disengage by breaking away in formation; If the attacker chose to continue, their line would be broken as well. This often led to inconclusive battles, or allowed the losing side to minimize its losses; but Suleyman wanted a conclusive action. Suleyman's solution to the problem was to cut the opposing line in three. Approaching in two columns, sailing perpendicular to the enemy's line, one towards the center of the opposing line and one towards the trailing end, his ships would break the enemy's formation into three, surround one third, and force them to fight to the end. Suleyman will be happy to cut the line just in front of the Gibraltar flagship, Sant Jorge; the isolated ships in front of the break would not be able to see the flagship's signals, hopefully taking them out of combat while they re-formed. The plan had three principal advantages. First, the Califal fleet would close with the Gibraltar-Malagka as quickly as possible, reducing the chance that they would be able to escape without fighting. Second, it would quickly bring on a mêlée and frantic battle by breaking the Gibraltar-Malagka line and inducing a series of individual ship-to-ship actions, in which the Califal were likely to prevail. Suleyman knew that the superior seamanship, gunnery and better morale of his crews were great advantages. Third, it would bring a decisive concentration on the rear of the Gibraltar-Malagka fleet. The ships in the van of the enemy fleet would have to turn back to support the rear, which would take a long time. Additionally, once the Gibraltar-Malagka line had been broken, their ships would be relatively defenceless against powerful broadsides from the Califal fleet, and it would take them a long time to reposition to return fire. The main drawback of attacking head-on was that as the leading Califal ships approached, the Gibraltar-Malagka fleet would be able to direct raking broadside fire at their bows, to which they would be unable to reply. To lessen the time the fleet was exposed to this danger, Suleyman had his ships make all available sail (including stuns'ls), yet another departure from the norm. He was also well aware that Malagka gunners were ill-trained and would have difficulty firing accurately from a moving gun platform. The Combined Fleet was sailing across a heavy swell, causing the ships to roll heavily and exacerbating the problem. Suleyman's plan was indeed a gamble, but a carefully calculated one. During the period of blockade off the coast of Spain, Suleyman instructed his captains, over two dinners aboard Glory, on his plan for the approaching battle. The order of sailing, in which the fleet was arranged when the enemy was first sighted, was to be the order of the ensuing action so that no time would be wasted in forming a precise line.The attack was to be made in two lines. One, led by his second-in-command Vice-Admiral Muhammed, was to sail into the rear of the enemy line, while the other, led by Nelson, was to sail into the centre and vanguard. The intention was to split the enemy line and engage in close quarter action, a form of combat in which, Suleyman believed, the Califal fleet would have the advantage. In preparation for the battle, Suleyman ordered the ships of his fleet to be painted in a distinctive red and black pattern (later known as the Suleyman Chequer) that would make them easy to distinguish from their opponents. Suleyman was careful to point out that something had to be left to chance. Nothing is sure in a sea battle, so he left his captains free from all hampering rules by telling them that "No captain can do very wrong if he places his ship alongside that of the enemy." In short, circumstances would dictate the execution, subject to the guiding rule that the enemy's rear was to be cut off and superior force concentrated on that part of the enemy's line. Commander Bazan himself expressed his belief that Suleyman would use some sort of unorthodox attack, stating specifically that he believed—accurately—that Suleyman would drive right at his line. But he was suffering from a loss of nerve. Arguing that the inexperience of his officers meant he would not be able to maintain formation in more than one group, he chose not to act on his assessment. Departure The weather, however, suddenly turned calm following a week of gales. This slowed the progress of the fleet leaving the harbour, giving the Caliph plenty of warning. Bazan had drawn up plans to form a force of four squadrons, each containing both Gibraltar and Malagka ships. Following their earlier vote on 8 January to stay put, some captains were reluctant to leave Cádiz, and as a result they failed to follow Bazan 's orders closely and the fleet straggled out of the harbour in no particular formation. It took most of 10 January for Bazan to get his fleet organised; it eventually set sail in three columns for the Straits of Gibraltar to the southeast. That same evening, Achille spotted a force of 18 Califal warships in pursuit. The fleet began to prepare for battle and during the night, they were ordered into a single line. The following day, Suleyman's fleet of 27 ships was spotted in pursuit. Bazan again ordered his fleet into three columns, but soon changed his mind and ordered a single line. The result was a sprawling, uneven formation. At 5:40 a.m. on 11 January, the British, with the Franco-Spanish fleet between the British and Cadiz. At circa 6 a.m., Nelson gave the order to prepare for battle. At 8 am the Malagka ship, which had been keeping watch on the Combined Fleet overnight, observed the Califal fleet still "forming the lines" in which it would attack. At 8 a.m., Bazan ordered the fleet to wear together (turn about) and return to Cádiz. This reversed the order of the allied line, placing the rear division in the vanguard. The Malagka and Gibraltar fleet now formed an uneven, angular crescent, with the slower ships generally to leeward and closer to the shore. By 11 a.m. Suleyman's entire fleet was visible to Bazan, drawn up in two parallel columns. The two fleets would be within range of each other within an hour. Bazan was concerned at this point about forming up a line, as his ships were unevenly spaced and in an irregular formation. The Malagka-Gibraltar fleet was drawn out nearly five miles (8 km) long as Suleyman's fleet approached. As the Califal drew closer, they could see that the enemy was not sailing in a tight order, but rather in irregular groups. Suleyman could not immediately make out the Gibraltar flagship as the Gibraltar and Malagka were not flying command pennants. Suleyman was outnumbered. As the two fleets drew closer, anxiety began to build among officers and sailors. Battle The 150 mm artillery fire started at 12 a.m. after Suleyman gave the "opening fire" order. The ships of the Allied fleet soon began to receive impacts, CMN Malagka soon received critical impacts that were soon completely dismantled, unable to maneuver and largely unable to fight, as they blinded their batteries, but kept their flag for 45 minutes until that the following boats came to his rescue. For 40 minutes, Glory of Al-lāh was under fire; although many shots were lost, others killed and wounded several members of his team and fired on his wheel, so she had to be deflected from her rudder under the cover. The Glory of Al-lāh still could not answer. At 12:45, Glory of Al-lāh cut the enemy line between Bazan's flagship and two ships of Malagka; She approached Sant Jorge, firing a devastating side through her stern that killed and wounded many in her lookouts. Bazan thought that the boarding would take place, and with the banner of his boat in hand, said to his men: "I will throw it on the enemy ship and we will take it back there!" A general melee was produced and, during that fight, the Glory of Al-lāh faced three ships of Malagka. Malagka's crew, which included a strong infantry corps (with three captains and four lieutenants), gathered to try to grab and take over the Glory of Al-lāh. The gunners of the Glory of Al-lāh were called to cover to fight against the inmates, and she stopped firing. The artillerymen were forced to retreat to the deck by Malagka's grenades. While the Gibraltar Ghouls were preparing to board Glory of Al-lāh, another Caliphian ship approached unloading a heavy fire on its side. Towards the end of the battle, and with the combined fleet overwhelmed, Commander Bazan, who was still relatively uncommitted, tried to come to the aid of the collapsed center. After not being able to break through, he decided to interrupt the engagement and led the withdrawal of the rest of the fleet. Aftermath After the end of the battle and the storm, only five ships returned to their ports of origin. The MBG Blas de Lezo was maintained to achieve the withdrawal of the surviving ships led by Sant Jorge. The battle turned out to be a defeat for Malagka and Gibraltar, with Gibraltar having to support the weight of the defense of the strait, defense that would prove ineffective in the next events. Results of the battle After the battle, the Caliphate's Navy was never seriously challenged by Malagka in a full-scale combat. Suleyman became, and remains, the greatest naval war hero of the Caliphate, and an inspiration to the Corsairs affiliated with him, though his unorthodox tactics were seldom emulated by later generations. Consequences. After the battle, weeks later, a fleet of repaired freighters began the disembarkation in the Bay of Cadiz, where Gibraltar revealed its greater experience in land combat.